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The Conventional Wisdom 
If there is any agreement among the pundits, this surely 
must be it: the coming war on Iraq will be fought largely over 
oil. The gist of the argument is simple enough, and can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
x In order to continue growing, the world economy 
needs plenty of cheap oil; 
x The OPEC cartel stands in the way of that goal. For 
years, its members have manipulated output to keep 
prices high; 
x Now, there is finally an opportunity to change the 
rules of the game, perhaps even to make the oil cartel 
irrelevant; 
x The entry point is Iraq. The country, says George 
Bush Jr., has become a ‘global threat.’ It supports ter-
rorism, it has weapons of mass destruction, and it has 
a ruler unscrupulous enough to use them. In the age 
of ‘preventive strikes,’ these are sufficient reasons to 
invade thy neighbour; 
x Once victorious, the invading armies will install a 
new, more friendly leader. This ruler will adopt a 
new energy policy, hostile to OPEC and friendly to 
the United States and the West. And since Iraq has 
11 per cent of the world’s crude oil reserves and the 
ability to pump out plenty of it, the days of high oil 
prices will soon be over.  
 
The Economist of London expresses this logic as fol-
lows: ‘America’s chief interest in going after Iraq’s presi-
dent, Saddam Hussein, is doubtless to save the world from 
his actual or potential weapons of mass destruction. An-
other large consideration, secondary as it may be, has at-
tracted less attention than it should have: the effects that 
would follow from the opening up of the country's enor-
mous reserves of oil. . . . It might seem, then, that knocking 
out Mr Hussein would kill two birds with one stone: a 
dangerous dictator would be gone, and with him would go 
the cartel that for years has manipulated prices, engineered 
embargoes and otherwise harmed consumers.’1 
The Middle East presently accounts for 65 per cent of 
the world’s proven oil reserves and 30 per cent of its day to 
day production – and the figures are only expected to grow 
in the coming decades. According to Professor Anthony 
Cordesman of the Washington Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, these facts lead to a simple conclu-
sion. Given that U.S. prosperity depends on global pros-
perity, he says, and since global prosperity depends on free 
access to Middle East oil reserves, it follows that the Gulf 
region, where most of this oil comes from, must be treated 
as ‘a truly vital American strategic interest.’ The United 
States, he continues, is the only country with the political, 
economic and military power to secure this global (read 
national) interest, and it should therefore take direct re-
sponsibility through direct involvement in the region.2 
Radical writers generally agree that the United States 
is after oil, although many of them add that the pursuit of 
energy is part of a larger game-plan whose aim is not eco-
nomic prosperity per se, but power. ‘What the world is 
now facing,’ write the editors of Monthly Review, ‘is the 
prospect of a major new development in the history of im-
perialism.’ ‘Direct U.S. access to oil and the profits of U.S. 
oil corporations,’ they maintain, ‘are not enough by them-
selves to explain overriding U.S. interests in the Middle 
East. Rather the United States sees the whole region as a 
crucial part of its strategy of global power.’3 
 
The Catch 
These views all ring true. Without oil, the world economy 
will certainly come to a halt; capitalism will fall into a 
serious crisis; and U.S. hegemony would be dealt a seri-
ous, perhaps mortal blow. That much is obvious. 
But then these same arguments could have been 
made – and were made – in the 1960s, in the 1970s and in 
the 1980s. So why the sudden return to old-style ‘imperi-
alism’?  
Indeed, the whole situation seems paradoxical. Dur-
ing the 1970s, when the Middle East accounted for nearly 
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40 per cent of global output (compared with only 30 per 
cent today), the United States and Europe actually moved 
in the opposite direction, allowing local rulers to national-
ise their oil resources and to kick out Western oil compa-
nies. In other words, these governments tolerated a bla-
tant attack on ‘private property’ – and tolerate it they did 
despite the fact that the property in question belonged to 
the world’s most powerful firms, and that OPEC’s obvi-
ous intention was to raise the price of oil.  
And indeed, the oil companies quickly realized they 
had no reason to fuss over oil fields and drilling rights. 
On the contrary, it was much better to have the cartel 
manage output and take on the criticism for the ‘energy 
crisis.’  
Naturally, the oil companies insisted they had noth-
ing to do with the ploy. They were merely ‘interested by-
standers,’ as one famous analyst put it. They simply hap-
pened to be in the right place at the right time. Their prof-
its were huge, sure, but they were ‘windfall profits,’ the 
result of an accidental bliss.  
By comparison, the current situation seems far less 
menacing. Judging by the real price of oil, which kept 
falling for the past twenty years, OPEC has been rather 
ineffective. In 1999, when the price of oil plunged to $10 
a barrel, The Economist confidently stated that ‘the world 
is awash with oil, and it is likely to remain so.’4  
As experts would later show, this picture was a bit 
distorted, to put it mildly. There was in fact vast technical, 
business and political cooperation between OPEC and 
the companies. But then, since this type of research rarely 
made it to the popular media, most people, although of-
ten suspecting the oil companies, never really knew why.6  
Under these circumstances, and assuming it is indeed 
‘all about oil,’ shouldn’t the cartel be left alone to pursue 
its futile manoeuvres? Or perhaps OPEC’s ineffectiveness 
is precisely the problem? 
Of course, whether or not they knew about it, ordi-
nary people suffered greatly from this mischievous ar-
rangement. During the 1970s and early 1980s, higher oil 
prices have thrown the world into a stagflationary spiral 
of rising prices together with contracting output and soar-
ing unemployment. But then, suffering doesn’t give you a 
say in the global political economy of oil. Power does. 
Much of the confusion stems from two mistaken as-
sumptions: first, that OPEC had ‘expropriated’ the oil 
companies and that these companies now want to ‘re-
claim’ their lost concessions, and second, that Western 
governments want nothing more than low oil prices. As it 
turns out, the situation is a bit more complicated.  
 
The Global Politics of Oil 1. OPEC and the Oil Companies
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Start with OPEC and the companies. In the 1970s, the 
latter indeed lost their drilling concessions to the former. 
But oil companies aren’t interested in drilling concessions, 
they are interested in profit. And here OPEC gave them 
something really precious: a 10-fold increase in the real price 
of oil between 1970 and 1980. The oil companies could 
never have achieved this pricing feat on their own. And 
what a feat it was: it made their profits rise 5-fold in just ten 
years!  
 The converging interests of OPEC and the oil com-
panies are illustrated in Figure 1. The chart shows the 
profits of the world’s ‘Petro Core’ consisting of the six 
largest private oil companies: British Petroleum, Chevron, 
Exxon, Mobil, Royal/Dutch Shell and Texaco.5 It also 
shows the oil revenues earned by OPEC governments. 
The positive correlation is obvious and needs no further 
elaboration. What was good for OPEC was also good for 
the oil companies, and vice versa.  
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From Crisis to Prices 
As noted earlier, there is a popular belief that Western 
governments, representing the ‘national interest,’ are keen 
on having low oil prices. The problem with this view is 
that those who articulate the ‘national interest’ often tai-
lor it to their own ends. Or better still, they articulate it in 
words, but ignore it in deeds.  
 During the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘national interest’ 
of the United States was dominated by a ‘Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition’ made of large armament, oil and 
financial companies. The long tentacles of this coalition 
have become difficult to disentangle from the various ap-
paratuses of the state. Their representatives sat in White 
House; they had their envoys in various branches of the 
government and the army to whom they supplied weap-
ons; they paid taxes and received subsidies (with the latter 
often exceeding the former); they financed political cam-
paigns; they influenced and often determined policy; they 
owned various media outlets. The list goes on. 
This coalition had an interest in high oil prices. It 
couldn’t admit it openly, of course, and the U.S. govern-
ment never tired of reiterating its ‘commitment’ to cheap 
energy. But when it came to the United States’ actual 
foreign policies, particularly in the Middle East, the effect 
was generally to raise prices, not lower them. 
After the end of the Vietnam Conflict, the main ‘hot 
spot’ of the Cold War shifted to the Middle East. The 
United States and the Soviet Union, aided by numerous 
other countries, supplied massive amounts of weapons to 
the region (invariably in the interest of ‘stabilization’). 
The regional arms race made the U.S. military contrac-
tors rich, and with a succession of hawkish presidents in 
office – from Richard Nixon, to Gerald Ford, to Ronald 
Reagan – the contractors found it easy to keep that race 
going. Even the conciliatory Jimmy Carter, whose 1976-
80 term in office briefly broke the bellicosity chain, 
couldn’t buck the trend. 
Conflict and war in the region had a profound impact 
on oil. It is important to note that during the 1970s and 
1980s, there was never any real ‘shortage’ of oil in the 
world.7 Indeed, from a purely ‘economic’ perspective, the 
price of oil should have tumbled. But the region was ‘in 
flames,’ with cyclical hostilities nourished by Western 
and Eastern weapons and hyped up relentlessly by the 
media. Oil, although plentiful throughout the period, was 
made to look ‘scarce’ and ‘vulnerable.’ The price of oil 
was raised and kept high, OPECs oil revenues soared and 
the oil companies grew fabulously rich. 
 
Reversal of fortune 
By the mid 1980s, the tide finally began to turn. Commu-
nism was on its last leg; developing countries had become 
‘emerging markets’ open to western investment; the high-
tech mania started to gather momentum; and the winds 
of neoliberalism began blowing stronger and stronger.  
The Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition was increas-
ingly challenged by a new ‘Technodollar-Mergerdollar 
Coalition’ geared toward high-tech, global expansion and 
corporate mergers. For this new coalition, high energy 
prices were a threat. They spoiled business confidence 
and growth in ‘emerging markets,’ they upset capital mo-
bility, and they interfered with the hyping up of the stock 
market.  
The growing strength of the new coalition became 
evident as early as 1991. George Bush Sr., a Weapondol-
lar-Petrodollar loyalist who had just orchestrated a major 
international war, was more or less forced to announce 
the dawn of a ‘new world order’ of peace. His successor, 
Bill Clinton, was already a declared ‘peacenick’ who 
moved swiftly toward resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The shift from war profits to peace dividends was now in 
full swing. 
The effect of this shift on the armament and oil inter-
ests was devastating. During the 1990s, world military 
budgets fell by over 1/3rd in real terms, arms exports went 
into a tail spin, and the large armament contractors were 
reduced to a mere shadow of their past glory.  
The oil companies suffered a similar fate. Figure 2 
below shows the relationship between their net profit and 
the price of oil. During the early 1980s, crude prices ex-
pressed in today’s dollars exceeded $80 a barrel. For the 
world, this was the height of the ‘energy crisis.’ For the 
oil companies, it was the peak of the ‘energy boom’: their 
earnings reached nearly 20 per cent of all global corporate 
profit.  
But from then on, it was all downhill. The lingering 
Iraq-Iran War of 1980-88, the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, the 1986 bombing of Libya, the mid 1980s 
‘tanker war’ in the Gulf – the 1990/91 Gulf War all 
helped to slow down the slide, but they didn’t stop it. 
And as prices fell so did profits. The abyss was reached at 
the end of Clinton’s presidency. In 2000, oil prices tum-
bled to $14 a barrel in today’s dollars, and the share of oil 
companies in global profit fell to less than 3 per cent – 
their lowest ever. 
                                                 
7 If oil prices were indeed determined by physical ‘scarcity,’ one 
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The main excuse was September 11. The U.S. imme-
diately started beating the war drums, and within a 
month invaded Afghanistan in search for the ghostly Bin 
Laden. It didn’t find him there, but the price of oil kept 
rising. In parallel, and in sharp contrast to his White 
House predecessor, Bush Jr. gave Ariel Sharon a carte 
blanche to deal with the Palestinians as he saw fit. The 
resulting escalation contributed further to the feeling that 
the region was again in flames, and that oil was once 
more likely to become ‘scarce.’ These developments, to-
gether with a timely oil strike in Venezuela and the pros-
pect for an imminent attack on Iraq, helped send the price 
of oil soaring to over $30 a barrel and raise oil profit to 
nearly 7 per cent of the world total (see Figure 2).  
2. Oil Prices and Oil Profits
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It’s all about oil 
Now let’s think about the meaning of all of this. As we 
have seen, the oil companies have just begun climbing 
from the abyss. To continue their ascent, they need higher 
oil prices, and the most effective way of raising these 
prices is to have another Middle East conflict. Similarly 
for the armament companies. If they are to remain viable 
in a uni-polar world, they will need new wars, and 
quickly. Luck has it, and these two groups now have their 
most friendly president ever in the White House. And this 
friendly president is ready, in fact eager, to send his army 
to fight Iraq, with or without UN approval.  
 
Toward a new war 
Something had to be done, and quickly. The Weapondol-
lar-Petrodollar Coalition assailed the White House with 
all its guns blazing. They spared no effort. Massive finan-
cial support, legal pressures, electoral manoeuvres, deceit 
and outright forgery were all brought to bear. In the end 
the coalition managed to have George Bush Jr. put in 
office.  
For the Weapodollar-Petrodollar Coalition, the new 
war is indeed about oil, but not in the way most people 
think. The interest of this coalition lies not in stabilizing 
the region and making oil plentiful and cheap, but on the 
contrary, in maintaining instability, in making oil look 
scarce and in raising its price higher. 
The Bush family ties to the U.S. business elite, in-
cluding the Harrimans, Morgans and Rockefellers among 
others, go back to Bert Walker, George Bush Jr.’s great-
grandfather. Over the years, the family has come to oc-
cupy, through ownership and managerial posts, various 
strategic positions in railroads, finance, oil and armament. 
It also placed itself well in the seats of government, state 
security and military procurement. In addition to God 
and the mighty dollar, the family has retained a strong 
belief in white supremacy, especially the supremacy of 
the Eastern seaboard elites. It has also entertained close 
links to far-right and neo-Nazi groups within the Republi-
can party.8 With this background, George Bush Jr., al-
though not the brightest of the lot, was certainly fit for the 
task of reinstating the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coali-
tion.  
Interestingly, large firms outside the Weapondollar-
Petrodollar Coalition – that is, companies with no direct 
connection to armament and oil – haven’t voiced any real 
opposition to the war. This silence is rather strange, to 
say the least. Don’t the Microsofts, General Motors and 
Vivendis of the world stand to lose from higher energy 
cost and the global stagnation which is almost sure to 
follow? Furthermore, if oil prices and oil profits were to 
rise, wouldn’t these companies lose their primacy relative 
to the Exxons and Lockheed Martins? Perhaps, but this 
relative reordering may be a cheap price to pay for the 
benefits to be had. 
As it turns out, the biggest threat facing large firms at 
the moment is deflation. The global debt burden is the 
highest ever in history -- roughly twice what it was on the 
eve of the Great Depression. Corporate pricing power, on 
the other hand, is perhaps the weakest since the Depres-
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sion. Under these circumstances, if disinflation were to 
give way to falling prices, the specter of chain bankrupt-
cies and debt deflation could make the Great Depression 
look like child’s play. Given this risk, any move toward 
higher inflation – even if accompanied by stagnation – is 
to be warmly welcomed.  
Now, since the late 1960s, higher oil prices have al-
ways triggered higher inflation. And the ‘mechanism’ con-
tinues to operate like clockwork: since 1999, world infla-
tion trailed the gyrations of oil prices with almost reli-
gious devotion. Thus, if oil prices continue to rise, infla-
tion will most likely follow; this would in turn remove  
the specter of deflation, and the large companies could 
sound a big sigh of relief. For these companies there 
would also be an icing on the cake. Inflation usually 
works to redistribute income from labour to capital and 
from small firms to larger ones. It will therefore make the 
leading companies better off relatively, if not absolutely. 
The most ambivalent of the lot are probably the 
OPEC governments. The explicit shift toward interven-
tionism on part of the United States and its Western allies 
must be worrying for them. Theirs is the only interna-
tional cartel which managed to obtain some degree of 
autonomy from Western influence, and this autonomy is 
now in great danger. On the other hand, part of the car-
tel’s weakness stems precisely from its inability to keep 
prices high, something which a new conflict managed by 
direct U.S. intervention may help rectify. 
The only ones for whom there seems to be no ambigu-
ity are the rest of us. The new wars, fought in the name of 
security and prosperity, are likely to bring neither.  
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